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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On May 7, 1998, the Court of Appeals of New York entered uncharted legal 
territory.  It decided the fate of a divorced couple’s five pre-zygotes that had been 
medically preserved for future attempts at achieving pregnancy.1  In Kass v. Kass, 
the court upheld a ruling of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New 
York and enforced a consent agreement signed by the couple prior to participating in 
a reproductive procedure known as in vitro fertilization (IVF).2  Recognizing that it 
is the inherent role of the gamete donors to determine the disposition of their genetic 
offspring,3 the court reasoned that the terms of the prior consent agreement were 
sufficiently definite to ascertain the true meaning of the parties at the moment that 
the document was signed.4  Additionally, the court reinforced the determination of 
the Appellate Division, which overturned the initial decision of the trial court, and 
held that a woman does not have absolute authority with respect to the disposition of 
fertilized genetic material because her constitutional rights to privacy and bodily 
integrity are not implicated until the moment that implantation occurs.5 
                                                                
1Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998). 
2Welden E. Havins & James J. Dalessio, The Ever-Widening Gap Between the Science of 
Artificial Reproductive Technology and the Laws which Govern That Technology, 48 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 825, 833-34 n.67 (1999).  “IVF literally means ‘fertilization in a glass.’  IVF is 
accomplished by combining sperm and ovum in a petri dish where fertilization occurs.”  Id. at 
833-34. 
3Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581 (App. Div. 1997); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn. 1992). 
4Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175. 
5Id. at 179. 
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The decision in Kass illustrates a situation where well-founded common law 
contract principles were applied to a novel reproductive issue in order to respond to 
rapidly evolving technological progress.  However, this legal dilemma presents a 
variable that warrants special attention.  This was not a case where two business 
colleagues sought redress from the court to resolve a dispute over the price of 
commercial goods.  Instead, the parties involved in the case at hand struggled for 
control of a possible human life; Mrs. Kass hoped to preserve the pre-zygotes for 
future implantation attempts, and Mr. Kass sought to avoid the tribulations 
associated with compulsory parenthood.  Bearing this in mind, this Comment will 
evaluate the decisions rendered by both the Supreme Court of New York and the 
New York Court of Appeals.  Part II discusses the relevant facts considered by the 
court in determining the disposition of the Kass’s five frozen pre-zygotes.  Part III 
reviews the decision of the Supreme Court of New York, which held that a woman 
has the ultimate decisional authority with respect to frozen genetic material, because 
it implicates her constitutional rights to privacy and bodily integrity.  Part IV 
analyzes the plurality opinion delivered by the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of New York, which reversed the court’s initial holding.  Part V examines the 
decision of the New York Court of Appeals that reinforced the ruling of the 
Appellate Division.  Finally, Part VI analyzes the holdings set forth by the New York 
courts and suggests alternative methods to resolve dispositional disputes in the 
future.  
II.  FACTS 
Immediately after Maureen and Steven Kass consummated their marriage on July 
4, 1988, the couple began trying to conceive a child.6  Mrs. Kass was worried that 
her prenatal exposure to a fertility drug known as diethylstilbestrol (DES) would 
complicate her ability to carry a baby to term.7  The couple soon discovered that the 
matter was far more serious – Mrs. Kass could not become pregnant.8   
In August 1989, the couple contacted the John T. Mather Memorial Hospital in 
Port Jefferson, Long Island, to seek assistance for Mrs. Kass’s medical 
complications.  Following several unsuccessful attempts at artificial insemination, 
they enrolled in a hospital program designed to assist patients in becoming pregnant 
through IVF.9  As with any complex medical procedure, the egg retrieval process 
associated with IVF causes considerable physical pain.10  Additionally, the odds of a 
patient becoming pregnant during the first attempt are slim.  These factors invariably 
inflict serious physical, emotional and financial burdens on a couple hoping to bear a 
                                                                
6Id. at 175. 
7Id. 
8Id.  
9Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175.  “Typically, the IVF procedure begins with hormonal 
stimulation of a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple eggs.  The eggs are then removed by 
laparascopy or ultrasound-directed needle aspiration and placed in a glass dish, where sperm 
are introduced.  Once a sperm cell fertilizes the egg, this fusion - or pre-zygote - divides until 
it reaches the four - to - eight-cell stage, after which several pre-zygotes are transferred to the 
woman’s uterus by a cervical catheter.”  Id. 
10Id.  
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/10
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child.  Modern science has responded to the complications associated with IVF by 
introducing a process known as “cryopreservation.”11  In order to reduce the amount 
of pain that a patient must endure, several eggs are initially extracted from the 
woman’s uterus and immediately joined with the male donor’s sperm to complete the 
fertilization process.12  Next, the fused genetic material divides to the eight-cell 
stage, and a doctor-recommended number of the pre-zygotes are implanted in the 
uterus in an attempt to impregnate the patient.13  The pre-zygotes that are not 
immediately implanted are frozen or “cryogenically preserved” for subsequent 
attempts.14 
Maureen Kass underwent the process of egg retrieval five times and implantation 
nine times.15  She became pregnant twice, but was unable to carry either pregnancy 
to term.16  On May 12, 1993, before the final egg retrieval procedure, the Kasses 
signed an agreement to permit the hospital to cryopreseve any un-implanted pre-
zygotes.17  Along with consent to the cryopreservation procedure, the couple 
executed a seven page “Additional Consent Form,” which described the future 
disposition of any un-implanted zygotes upon occurrence of circumstances that 
would render the parties unable to make a determination themselves.18  Mr. and Mrs. 
Kass resolved that, in the event of “death or any other unforeseen circumstance,” the 
cryopreserved pre-zygotes were to be donated to the hospital’s IVF program for 
approved research and investigation.19   
                                                                
11Id. 
12Id. 
13Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175. 
14Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 592; Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175. 
15Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175-76. 
16Id. at 176. 
17Donna M. Sheinbach, Comment, Examining Disputes Over Ownership Rights to Frozen 
Embryos: Will Prior Consent Documents Survive if Challenged by State Law and/or 
Constitutional Principles?, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 989, 1006 (1999).  “On May 12, 1993, the 
couple gave their IVF physician permission to retrieve as many eggs as possible by signing 
Addendum No. 1-1 to the Clinic’s General Consent Form No. 1.”  Id.   
18Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 176.  “The first two forms, ‘GENERAL INFORMED CONSENT 
FORM NO. 1: IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER’ and 
‘ADDENDUM NO. 1-1,’ consist of 12 single spaced typewritten pages explaining the 
procedure, its risks and benefits, at several points indicating that, before egg retrieval could 
begin, it was necessary for the parties to make informed decisions regarding the dispositions 
of the fertilized eggs”  Id. 
19Id.  First, in pertinent part “Informed Consent Form No. 2: Cryopreservation of Human 
Pre-Zygotes” provides: “We understand that our frozen pre-zygotes will be stored for a 
maximum of five years.  We have the principal responsibility to decide the disposition of our 
frozen pre-zygotes.  Our frozen pre-zygotes will not be released from storage for any purpose 
without the written consent of both of us, consistent with the policies of the IVF Program and 
applicable law.  In the event of divorce, we understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-
zygotes must be determined in a property settlement and will be released as directed by order 
of a court of competent jurisdiction.  Should we for any reason no longer wish to attempt to 
initiate a pregnancy, we understand that we may determine the disposition of our frozen pre-
3Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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Eight days after signing the agreements, Maureen Kass underwent her final egg 
retrieval procedure.20  By this stage in the IVF process, Mr. and Mrs. Kass had 
changed their plans and decided that the pre-zygotes should be implanted into 
Maureen Kass’s sister, who had volunteered to become a surrogate mother for the 
couple.21  Strain in the Kass’s marriage soon mounted when it became apparent that 
the IVF procedure was again unsuccessful, and Mrs. Kass’s sister opted not to 
continue the surrogacy contract.22  With their hopes of conceiving a child virtually 
shattered, the couple filed for divorce.23   
Without legal assistance, Maureen Kass drafted an uncontested divorce 
agreement that stated that the remaining five frozen pre-zygotes should be disposed 
of in the manner outlined in the Mather Hospital consent form.24  Shortly thereafter, 
Mrs. Kass experienced a change of heart and wrote letters to both the hospital and to 
her IVF physician relaying her adamant opposition to the destruction of the five pre-
zygotes.25  Less than one month after sending the letters, Maureen Kass filed a 
matrimonial action requesting sole custody of the frozen pre-zygotes so that her 
physician could later attempt implantation.26  Opposing Mrs. Kass’s custodial claim, 
                                                          
zygotes remaining in storage. ... The possibility of our death or any other unforeseen 
circumstances that may result in neither of us being able to determine the disposition of any 
stored frozen pre-zygotes requires that we now indicate our wishes.  THESE IMPORTANT 
DECISIONS MUST BE DISCUSSED WITH OUR IVF PHYSICIAN AND OUR WISHES 
MUST BE STATED (BEFORE EGG RETRIEVAL) ON THE ATTACHED ADDENDUM 
NO. 2-1, STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION.  THIS STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION MAY 
BE CHANGED ONLY BY OUR SIGNING ANOTHER STATEMENT OF DISPOSITION 
WHICH IS FILED WITH THE IVF PROGRAM.”  Id.  Second, “Informed Consent No. 2 - 
Addendum No. 2-1: Cryopreservation Statement of Disposition” states: “We understand that it 
is IVF Program Policy to obtain our informed consent to the number of pre-zygotes which are 
to be cryopreserved and to the disposition of excess cryopreserved pre-zygotes.  We are to 
indicate our choices by signing our initials where noted below.  1.  We consent to 
cryopreservation of all pre-zygotes which are not transferred during this IVF cycle for possible 
use ... by us in a future IVF cycle. . . . 2.  In the event that we no longer wish to initiate a 
pregnancy or are unable to make a decision regarding the disposition of the stored, frozen pre-
zygotes, we now indicate our desire for the disposition of our pre-zygotes and direct the IVF 
program to . . . (b) Our frozen pre-zygotes may be examined by the IVF Program for 
biological studies and be disposed of by the IVF Program for approved research investigation 
as determined by the IVF Program.”  Id. at 176-77. 
20Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177. 
21Id. 
22Id. 
23Id. at 177. 
24Id.  “‘The disposition of the frozen 5 pre-zygotes at Mather Hospital is that they should 
be disposed of [in] the manner outlined in our consent form and that neither Maureen Kass[,] 
Steve Kass or anyone else will lay claim to custody of these pre-zygotes.’”  Kass, 696 N.E.2d 
at 177. 
25Id. 
26Id. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/10
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Mr. Kass filed a counterclaim requesting specific performance of the IVF agreement, 
which bestowed the pre-zygotes to the Mather Hospital IVF program.27 
The Kasses stipulated to a settlement with respect to all issues other than each 
party’s claim regarding the disposition of the frozen pre-zygotes.28  Though a 
judgment for divorce was rendered on May 16, 1994, the custodial issue remained 
unresolved.29  Both parties agreed to permit the matter to be decided on the existing 
record.30  The Supreme Court of New York granted custody of the five pre-zygotes 
to Maureen Kass and permitted her to have them implanted.31  A divided Appellate 
Division of the Supreme Court of New York reversed, unanimously agreeing that 
two of the three theories advanced by the Supreme Court were unsound.32  The 
decision of the Appellate Division was subsequently affirmed by the Court of 
Appeals of New York.33 
III.  SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK 
On January 18, 1995, the Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County, entered a 
judgment awarding custody of the frozen pre-zygotes to Maureen Kass.34  Relying on 
Roe v. Wade and its progeny,35 the court held that a determination in Mr. Kass’s 
favor would implicate Mrs. Kass’s right to privacy and bodily integrity.36  The court 
advanced three main propositions in support of its holding.  First, the pre-zygotes, 
while not considered legal persons, nevertheless ought to be elevated to a legal status 
above property.37  Second, because a husband’s rights essentially terminate upon 
fertilization, regardless of whether the fertilization procedure takes place in vitro or 
in vivo,38 the disposition of the pre-zygotes should be left solely to Maureen Kass’s 
discretion.39  Third, the pre-divorce agreements were not dispositive of the situation 
and were insufficiently clear to properly extract the intentions of the parties.40  With 
                                                                
27Id. 
28Id. 
29Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 177. 
30Id. 
31Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154. 
32See generally, id.  
33Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175. 
34Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154. 
35410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
36Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154. 
37Id. 
38Havins & Dalessio, supra note 2, at 833 n.67.  “In vitro fertilization means fertilization 
outside of the body.  In vivo fertilization means fertilization within life or, as applied here, 
within the body.”  Id.  
39Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 154. 
40Id. 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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these determinations in mind, the court entered a judgment granting Maureen Kass 
the exclusive right to determine the fate of the genetic material in dispute.41 
IV.  SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK, APPELLATE DIVISION 
Following an appeal by Steven Kass, the Appellate Division of the Supreme 
Court of New York delivered a plurality opinion holding that the Kasses’ intentions 
set forth in the May 12, 1993 consent forms and the June 7, 1993 uncontested 
divorce agreement were sufficiently clear to properly determine the custodial 
disposition of the frozen pre-zygotes.42  All five justices who served on the appellate 
panel agreed that  “the Supreme Court committed a fundamental error in equating a 
prospective mother’s decision whether to undergo implantation of pre-zygotes, 
which are the product of her participation in an IVF procedure, with a pregnant 
woman’s right to exercise exclusive control over the fate of her non-viable fetus.”43  
Rejecting the application of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court reasoned that a 
woman’s right to privacy is not implicated until implantation actually occurs, for it is 
only then that her bodily integrity is at issue.44 
A.  Majority 
Holding that the controversies that arise as a result of IVF are “intensely personal 
and essentially private manners which are appropriately resolved by the prospective 
parents rather than the courts,” the majority applied standard theories of contract law 
in order to reveal the intent of the parties from the pre-existing agreements.45  The 
first inquiry turned on whether there were any objectively verifiable manifestations 
of mutual intent by the parties.46  The majority, extracting the intent of the parties 
from the document as a whole, determined that an unequivocal statement of intent 
did exist between the parties, which could be identified in the informed consent 
agreement.47  Looking at the language of the document, the court noted numerous 
uses of plural subject tense such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘our.’48  Additionally, at various 
times throughout the document the couple demonstrated their desire to maintain 
decisional authority, acknowledging “their joint right and obligation to provide for 
the disposition of any frozen pre-zygotes in the event that they cannot render such 
joint decision.”49 
                                                                
41Id. 
42Id. 
43Id. at 155. 
44Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 155. 
45Id. at 162; see also John A. Robertson, Meaning What You Sign; Kass v. Kass Regarding 
Disposition of Frozen Embryos, THE HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, July 1, 1998, at 22 “Although 
it may not be easy for couples to envision accurately their future wishes when they are focused 
on achieving fertilization and pregnancy, the right to control future disposition by prior 
directive seems clearly preferable to having a court decide.”  Id. 
46Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 155. 
47Id. at 158, 163. 
48Id. at 158. 
49Id. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/10
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The court ultimately divided over the document’s failure to specifically list 
divorce as a condition contemplated in the statement of intent for disposition.  The 
majority viewed the document against the backdrop of general contract law and 
interpreted the provision as though death and incapacity were just examples of 
conditions that could prevent a joint decision, rendering consideration of the parties’ 
intent appropriate.50  This holding contradicted the concurring and dissenting 
justices’ conclusions that the two scenarios set forth, namely death and incapacity, 
were the exclusive conditions that could trigger application of the provision in 
question.51 
The court next considered whether another section of the informed consent 
document, which expressly addressed divorce, was binding.  This portion of the 
agreement provided that in the event of divorce, the legal ownership of the pre-
zygotes should be resolved in a property settlement in a court of proper jurisdiction.52  
The majority held that it did not state the dispositional intentions of the parties.53  
Instead, the purpose of the provision was to confer jurisdiction upon a competent 
court and to shield the hospital from liability if a legal dispute arose during the 
couple’s divorce proceedings.54  The majority determined that the statement did not 
diminish the expressed intent of the parties, which granted authority to the IVF 
program to retain the pre-zygotes.55 
The majority finally concluded that the informed consent document, viewed in its 
entirety, “provides irrefutable evidence that the parties intended to have the IVF 
program retain the stored pre-zygotes for study in the event that, as here, they were 
unable to jointly agree on continued participation in the program.”56  Also, a 
consideration of further manifestations of assent expressed by the parties through 
drafting and signing the uncontested divorce agreement alleviated any doubts that 
may have arisen regarding the intent of the parties.57 
B.  Concurrence   
Finding the informed consent agreement to be “fatally ambiguous,” one judge 
drafted a solo concurrence recognizing the financial and emotional burdens that 
necessarily assist compelled fatherhood.58  The concurring judge reasoned that the 
                                                                
50Id. at 159. 
51Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 164, 176. 
52Id. at 160.  Addendum No. 2-1 states, in pertinent part, “[I]n the event of divorce, we 
understand that legal ownership of any stored pre-zygotes must be determined in a property 
settlement and will be released as directed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction.”  Id. 
53Id. 
54Id. 
55Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 160. 
56Id. at 161. 
57Id. at 163.  “The documentary evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the parties in 
this case made such a clear and unequivocal choice, and the plaintiff’s subsequent change of 
heart cannot be permitted to unilaterally alter their mutual decision.”  Id. 
58Id. at 165-66.  In New York, parents are compelled to support their children until they 
reach the age of 21.  Currently, no means to voluntarily shield one parent from this obligation 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2000
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document stipulating the disposition of the pre-zygotes in the event of divorce 
demonstrates that ambiguity exists within the pre-existing agreements because it was 
signed in December 1993, six months after the parties first signed the 
cryopreservation agreement.59  Along with deeming the agreement to be fatally 
ambiguous, the opinion proposed that Steven Kass, as the objecting party, should 
have extended veto power over his former spouse’s proposed efforts to implant the 
frozen pre-zygotes.60 
C.  Dissent 
Two judges joined in the dissent and emphasized the need to place weight on the 
Tennessee Supreme Court decision from Davis v. Davis,61 because the facts were 
almost analogous to the scenario in Kass.62  While Mary Sue and Junior Davis were 
also involved in a custody dispute over the disposition of their cryopreserved pre-
zygotes, the scenario in Davis deviates slightly from Kass because the couple did not 
sign a dispositional agreement prior to participating in the IVF procedure.63  Like the 
concurrence, the dissent professed that there was fatal ambiguity within the Kass’s 
agreements that could not be resolved.  Adopting the ‘balancing of interests’ 
approach proposed by the Davis court, the dissent departed from the concurring 
opinion and placed equal emphasis on the interests of both of the parties involved 
rather than giving the benefit of the doubt to the party protesting implantation.64  
V.  COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
Chief Justice Kaye delivered the unanimous opinion of the Court of Appeals of 
New York affirming the decision of the Appellate Division and holding that “the 
informed consents signed by the parties unequivocally manifest their mutual 
intention that in the present circumstances the pre-zygotes be donated for research to 
the IVF program.”65  Advancing the general rule that “agreements between 
progenitors, or gamete donors, regarding disposition of their pre-zygotes should 
generally be presumed valid and binding, and enforced in any dispute,” the court 
reasoned that the prior consent forms between the parties expressed their intent with 
                                                          
exist.  Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 178; see also, Matter of Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 209 A.D.2d 298 
(1994). 
59Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 164. 
60Id. at 165. 
61842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992). 
62Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 174. 
63Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. 
64Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 178.  According to the dissent below, “the immediate question 
before [the court] is whether the burdens of unwanted paternity to the ‘would-not-be father’ 
exceed the deprivation of a possibly last opportunity for maternity to the ‘would-be mother’ in 
this case.”  Kass, 235 A.D.2d at 178. 
65Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol48/iss3/10
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sufficient clarity.66  The court ordered that the pre-zygotes be given to the Mather 
Hospital IVF program for use in reasonable research practices.67 
Cryopreservation preserves fertilized genetic material for extended lengths of 
time, inescapably leading to the possibility that minds and circumstances will change 
while the pre-zygotes remain cryopreserved and ready for implantation.  Reflecting 
on this concept, the Court of Appeals sought the true intentions of the parties before 
the couple’s tensions began to escalate.68  Chief Justice Kaye reinforced the 
underlying premise that dispositional decisions should be left to the progenitors 
rather than the courts and concluded that where an agreement exists that is 
sufficiently definite to determine the intentions of the parties, it should control.69 
The Court of Appeals employed reasoning similar to the Appellate Division and 
relied on three common law principles governing contracts in order to examine the 
prior consent agreement.  First, the court professed to look within the four corners of 
the contract to determine whether ambiguity existed.70  Second, examining the 
agreement in its entirety, the court considered both the relationship of the parties and 
the circumstances surrounding the agreement’s execution.71  Third, the court 
determined that where the parties’ overall intentions cannot be extracted from 
viewing the document in its entirety, the agreement should be construed to carry out 
the plain intentions and objections of the parties that the court gathers.72  Applying 
the three contract theories to analyze the agreement, Chief Justice Kaye concluded 
that Mr. and Mrs. Kass plainly and clearly expressed that they wanted the power to 
determine the disposition of the pre-zygotes to remain between them.  This 
conclusion was supported by the fact that the couple signed a document to proscribe 
what should happen even in the event of unforeseen circumstances that would render 
the parties unable to make a decision on their own.73 
Finally, the court looked at the clause describing that in the event of divorce, the 
disposition of the pre-zygotes should be determined in a property settlement.74  
Acknowledging both the concurring and dissenting opinions from the Appellate 
Division, the court conceded that the clause introduced ambiguity into the 
agreement.75  In order to alleviate this ambiguity, the court examined the clause in 
                                                                
66Id. at 180. 
67Id. at 181. 
68Id. at 180. 
69Id. 
70Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 180 (citing W.W.W. Assoc. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639 (N.Y. 
1990)). 
71Id.  The opinion quoted sound legal precedent derived from prior contract disputes 
holding that “particular words should be considered, not as if isolated from the context, but in 
the light of the obligation as a whole and the intention of the parties as manifested thereby.”  
Id. at 180-81 (quoting Atwater & Co. v. Panama R.R. Co., 159 N.E. 418 (N.Y. 1927)). 
72Id. at 181 (citing Williams Press v. New York, 335 N.E.2d 299 (N.Y. 1975); Empire 
Props Corp. v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 43 N.E.2d 25 (N.Y. 1942)). 
73Id. 
74Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 181. 
75Id. 
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light of the document as a whole and sought additional assistance from the 
uncontested divorce agreement drafted by Mrs. Kass.76  Ultimately, the court 
determined that the intentions of the parties were clear enough to extract a 
dispositional decision from the agreement.77   
VI.  ANALYSIS 
The field of human reproductive technology is rapidly growing to meet the needs 
of prospective parents.  In the United States alone, roughly 45,000 couples per year 
participate in IVF procedures in order to facilitate pregnancy and family life.78  
Nearly 9,000 of these procedures immediately result in actual birth, yet many 
fertilized eggs undergo the process of cryopreservation for future attempts at 
implantation.79  Though the problem resolved in this case represents an issue of first 
impression, the fact that some 100,000 cryopreserved pre-zygotes currently exist in 
the United States80 suggests that disputes arising over their dispositions will continue 
to occur.  These astonishing statistics demonstrate a need to establish prudent 
guidelines addressing the legal status and future disposition of genetic material.81 
A.  Balancing of Interests 
The New York Court of Appeals reinforced the crucial notion that decisional 
authority should be left to the parties, rather than the courts.82  If the parties’ 
statements of intent are sufficiently definite, it is not the responsibility of the court to 
step in and overrule a pre-existing agreement.  Nevertheless, after carefully reading 
the opinions delivered by the New York courts, two questions inevitably arise.  First, 
did the parties contemplate divorce when signing the agreement that willed their 
genetic material to the Mather Hospital IVF program?  Second, does the court’s 
determination that “unforeseen circumstances” includes the event of divorce 
represent a sound legal conclusion?  The Court of Appeals apparently engaged in a 
careful inquiry in order to ascertain the true intentions of the parties involved in the 
dispute.  If, after observing all of the evidence, the court validly concluded that the 
agreements between the parties clearly and correctly stated their true intentions, then 
the decision was proper.  However, if the court erroneously determined the sufficient 
clarity of the prior consent agreement, then the balancing of interests approach 
proposed by the court in Davis represents a better precedential analysis.   
                                                                
76Id. at 182. 
77
 Id. 
78Judy Peres, Couple’s Divorce Entangles Frozen Embryos, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Aug. 7, 
1999, at 1, Zone N. 
79Id. 
80Id. 
81See Elizabeth Neff, Behind Frozen Embryos Case Lies Consent Issue, CHICAGO DAILY 
LAW BULLETIN, Sept. 30, 1999, at 3. 
82Robertson, supra note 45, at 22.  “Such a rule has merit because it would ‘maximize 
procreative liberty by reserving to the progenitors the authority to make what is in the first 
instance a quinticentially personal, private decision’.  In addition, it would avoid costly 
litigation and ‘provide the certainty needed for effective … IVF programs.’”  Id. 
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In 1992, the Supreme Court of Tennessee first addressed the issue regarding the 
post-divorce disposition of Mary Sue and Junior Davis’s cryopreserved genetic 
material.83  After thorough review of the situation, the court concluded the following:   
Disputes involving the disposition of [pre-zygotes] produced by in vitro 
fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the 
progenitors.  If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, 
then their prior agreement concerning the disposition should be carried 
out.  If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties 
in using the [pre-zygotes] must be weighed.  Ordinarily, the party wishing 
to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a 
reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of 
[the pre-zygotes] in question.84 
In light of the fact that the couple in Davis did not sign a pre-existing agreement, 
the court applied a balancing of interests approach, taking into account the 
contentions of the relevant parties, the gravity of their interests, and the relative 
burdens that would be imposed by different solutions.85  The court weighed Mrs. 
Davis’s interest in donating the genetic material to another couple against Mr. 
Davis’s desire to avoid compelled fatherhood.  Finding for Mr. Davis, the court 
reasoned that “[d]onation, if a child came of it, would rob him twice – his 
procreational autonomy would be defeated and his relationship with his offspring 
would be prohibited.”86  Had Mrs. Davis opted to undergo implantation herself, the 
court would have placed more weight on her dispositional desire, providing that 
implantation was the only reasonable means by which she could obtain genetic 
motherhood.87 
Expanding upon the holding in Davis, where a pre-existing agreement exists that 
is fatally ambiguous and the parties’ intentions cannot be determined from 
examining the document, the court should balance the interests of the parties in order 
to render a just decision.  With respect to the Kass decision, Mrs. Kass wanted to 
attempt implantation.88  In order to prevail, she would bear the burden of proving that 
she is without any other reasonable means of obtaining genetic parenthood.  On the 
other hand, if Mrs. Kass failed to meet this burden, Mr. Kass, as the objecting party, 
would be afforded the presumption of having the greater interest and should prevail. 
B.  Careful Drafting and Legislation 
As a result of the Court of Appeals decision in Kass, New York precedent now 
dictates that pre-existing agreements between couples that pronounce the disposition 
                                                                
83Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. 
84Id. 
85Id. at 603. 
86Id. at 604. 
87Id. 
88Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. 
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of their genetic material are binding and enforceable.89  Accordingly, other arms of 
the law must evolve to ensure that divorce is an enumerated contingency within a 
party’s dispositional agreement.90   
In order to respond efficiently to the technological progress associated with 
human reproductive technology, and to cryopreservation specifically, a two-tiered 
approach is necessary to solve this novel legal dilemma.91  First, careful drafting by 
attorneys is imperative in order to inform the parties involved of the purpose of a 
pre-informed consent agreement.92  All foreseeable circumstances should be 
discussed with the parties involved in IVF so that explicit directions regarding the 
disposition of any genetic material can be expressly provided for in a written 
agreement.93  Second, the human element involved in a cryopreservation scenario 
presents a vital need to attend to dispositional disputes over genetic material in a 
separate, non-judicial branch of government.  Legislative action can and should be 
taken to force couples to contemplate foreseeable events such as divorce and to seek 
legal assistance in order to make binding agreements that emphatically state each 
party’s intentions.94 
Five months after the Kass decision, Chief Justice Kaye delivered a lecture at the 
Fordham Law School, stating that “lawyering in a new age means, above all, 
lawyering in a time of innovation and flux.”95  Mentioning Kass, Justice Kaye spoke 
briefly about the effects that the rapidly growing and changing field of technology 
has had on the legal world.  She reminded her audience that such progress was 
beyond contemplation only a few decades ago.96  As lawyers, the principle way to 
respond to novel issues raised as a result of technological progress is to remember 
                                                                
89Myrna Felder, Issues Raised by New Reproductive Techniques:  ‘Kass v. Kass’, NEW 
YORK L.J., June 10, 1998, at 3.  “Any attorney counseling individuals about to participate in 
an IVF program will do well to focus on the consent documents their clients are about to sign, 
since we know from the Court of Appeals’ opinion in Kass that, in New York State, those 
agreements will be valid and enforceable.”  Id. 
90Sheinbach, supra note 17, at 993.  “Currently, no federal law exists to provide 
uniformity with respect to disputes over embryo ownership and few states have legislation to 
deal with the novel issues new reproductive technology presents.”  Id. 
91See Neff, supra note 81, at 3.  Recent court battles over frozen pre-zygotes demonstrates 
the need for well drafted consent forms as well as new legislation regulating their contents. Id. 
92See id. 
93Robertson, supra note 45, at 23.  “By implication, Kass also means that IVF programs 
can rely on prior directives in disposing of frozen embryos, not just in the case of divorce, but 
in the case of abandonment, failure to pay storage fees, inability to agree and other 
contingencies.”  Id. 
94Neff, supra note 81, at 3. 
95Judith S. Kaye, Remarks: Lawyering for a New Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1998).  
“Almost thirty years ago, Chief Justice Burger said that we could not afford to continue using 
cracker-barrel corner grocer methods to operate courts on a supermarket age.”  Id. 
96Id. 
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that efficiency is a key value, but it is not the only important concern.97  Though 
issues that arise may seem legally simple, profound social circumstances often exist 
beyond the surface.98  This notion is especially applicable to the field of reproductive 
science where lawyers can tailor their practices to address the highly sensitive human 
issues surrounding medical procedures such as cryopreservation.  From this frame of 
reference, proper emphasis is focused on the need for attorneys to take time to 
inform their clients about the occurrence of not only divorce, but of all foreseeable 
conditions that may cause or prolong a marital dispute.99  Attorneys could then draft 
agreements that clearly reflect the parties’ intentions should such disputes arise.100 
This ‘beyond the surface approach’ used to address reproductive issues cannot be 
the sole responsibility of the attorney.  Through the state legislature, citizens can pro-
actively respond to legal issues that arise in conjunction with cryopreservation by 
implementing specific laws that act to safeguard couples from prospective 
dispositional disputes.  Regulations mandating that couples seek legal assistance 
when drafting consent agreements will expedite the legal process by assuring the 
court that the intentions of the parties are clearly stated after foreseeable future 
occurrences have been contemplated.  Several states have already begun to address 
the possibility of dispositional disputes over genetic material by incorporating the 
issue into state statutes.101 
Florida and New Hampshire are two front-runner states that have passed 
legislation dealing with reproductive technology.  Though the Florida legislature 
initiated minimal control over couples participating in IVF, New Hampshire 
exercised a more invasive approach, heavily legislating the field of reproductive 
technology.  For example, Florida Statute § 742.17102 directs couples to execute a 
written agreement that addresses the disposition of frozen pre-zygotes in the event of 
several circumstances including divorce and death.103  Where such a document does 
not exist, the statute grants all decisional authority to the donors of the genetic 
                                                                
97Id.  “When an ocean liner starts taking on water, you can devote a lot of your resources 
to efficient bailing operations.  You might also, however, want to look around for where the 
leak is, or keep a closer watch for icebergs in the first place.”  Id. 
98Kaye, supra note 95, at 2. 
99See Neff, supra note 81, at 3.  “Provisions should be included for scenarios of divorce, 
death, or incapacity.  To think of every ‘what if’ scenario is part of a lawyers job.  It’s 
preventative legal work so hopefully you don’t end up with a court case.”  Id. 
100Id. 
101See id.  The New York legislature, presumptively responding to the Kass decision, has 
initiated the drafting of a bill addressing this problem by requiring directives before treatment 
explaining what should be done with genetic material in the event of specific situations such 
as divorce, death, incapacity or abandonment.  Id. 
102FLA. STAT. ch. 741.17 (1999) in relevant part states:  “A commissioning couple and the 
treating physician shall enter into a written agreement that provides for the disposition of the 
commissioning couple’s eggs, sperm and pre-embryos in the event of divorce, the death of a 
spouse, or any other unforeseen circumstance.”  Id. 
103Sheinbach, supra note 17, at 1006.  “By prescribing a prior written agreement, Florida 
forces IVF patients to consider specifically how they wish to dispose of any resulting embryos 
before attempting to conceive through IVF.”  Id. 
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material; however, it does not address what should happen if the parties cannot reach 
an agreement.  New Hampshire, on the other hand, passed N.H. RSA 168-B:21104 to 
ensure that IVF participants make informed decisions after seeking counseling and 
exhibiting diligent reflection of all of the possible circumstances.  The statute 
requires that (1) a prior agreement be executed between the parties, and (2) judicial 
authorization occur before any surgical procedure.105  Furthermore, a second statute, 
N.H. RSA 168-B:18, calls for non-medical evaluation of the couple as well as a 
home study to assess the ability of the persons involved to provide for a child.106  
Perhaps a middle ground between these states’ legislative efforts would better 
address the issue.  
VII.  CONCLUSION 
Although the initial intentions of Mr. and Mrs. Kass were the appropriate starting 
point to begin a legal analysis, the human element involved in this dispute 
necessarily warrants further examination of the interests of the parties involved.  
When courts are called upon in the future to render a decision regarding the destiny 
of genetic material, a pre-existing agreement should be strongly considered, but 
                                                                
104N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:13 (1999).  “Eligibility”  In vitro fertilization and pre-
embryo transfer shall be performed in accordance with rules adopted by the department of 
health and human services and shall be available only to a woman: II.  Who has been 
medically evaluated and the results, documented in accordance with rules adopted by the 
department of health and human services, demonstrate the medical acceptability of a woman 
to undergo the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo transfer procedure; III.  Who receives 
counseling pursuant to RSA 168-B:18, and provides written certification of the counseling and 
evaluation to the health care provider performing the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo 
transfer procedure; and IV.  Whose husband, if the recipient if married, receives appropriate 
counseling, pursuant to RSA 168-B:18, and: (a) Successfully completes the medical 
evaluation, if he is the gamete donor in the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo transfer 
procedure; (b) Provides written certification of the non-medical counseling and any evaluation 
to the health care provider performing the in vitro fertilization or pre-embryo transfer 
procedure; and (c) Indicates, by a writing, acceptance of the legal rights and responsibilities of 
parenthood for any resulting child, unless the husband contributes his sperm for the in vitro 
fertilization or pre-embryo transfer procedure.  Id. 
105Sheinbach, supra note 17, at 1006. 
106N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:18 (1999).  I.  A non-medical evaluation shall be 
performed on each party by a psychiatrist, psychologist, pastoral counselor or social worker, 
who is licensed, certified, or authorized to practice under the laws and rules of the state of 
New Hampshire, who shall maintain a record of the findings and conclusions and make a copy 
available to the person evaluated.  Each party shall waive any privilege against disclosure of 
confidential communications and disclose a copy of the findings to the other parties prior to 
entering the contract.  A copy of the findings shall be filed with the court by each party, unless 
good cause is shown.  II.  The person conducting the non-medical examination shall determine 
the party’s suitability to parent by considering: (a) The ability and disposition of the person 
being evaluated to give a child love, affection and guidance.  (b) The ability of the person to 
adjust to and assume the inherent risks of the contract.  III.  A home study if each party 
involved shall be conducted by a licensed child placing agency or the department of health and 
human services to assess the ability and disposition of the person to provide the child with 
food, clothing, shelter, medical care and other basic necessities.  A copy of the findings shall 
be filed with the court by each party.  Id. 
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where ambiguity exists, it should not be dispositive.  Instead, a functional approach 
that seeks to balance the parties’ interests represents a better legal framework for 
analyzing dispositional disputes.  Additionally, if courts intend to enforce such 
agreements as legally binding contracts, then lawyers must place emphasis on careful 
drafting that demonstrates that the parties involved in reproductive technology have  
made informed decisions.  To help facilitate this procedure, state legislation must 
evolve along with precedent to ensure that all foreseeable circumstances are expressly 
provided for. 
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